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Perspectives on Watergate Panel
Comparing the Nixon and Clinton
Impeachments
by
FRED H. ALTSHULER*
This symposium's review of the 1974 impeachment proceedings
against President Richard Nixon' invites a comparison to the 1998
impeachment of President Bill Clinton. One notable difference is the
more strident and partisan character of the 1998 proceedings. The
1974 House Judiciary Committee's vote to approve articles of
impeachment against President Nixon was bipartisan,2 with as many
as seven of the Committee's seventeen Republicans voting in favor of
one or more of the articles.3 The 1998 House Judiciary Committee
remained sharply divided along party lines, with virtually all of the
Republicans voting in favor of all of the proposed articles of
* Fred H. Altshuler is a San Francisco attorney and a partner in the law firm of
Altshuler, Berzon, Nussbaum, Rubin & Demain. In 1974 he served as counsel on the
House of Representatives' Impeachment Inquiry Staff.
1. From July 24, 1974 through July 30, 1974, the House Judiciary Committee held
public hearings and approved three articles of impeachment against President Nixon. On
August 9, 1974, after the disclosure that previously withheld tape recordings showed his
complicity in the Watergate cover-up, President Nixon resigned. Accordingly, the articles
of impeachment approved by the 1994 House Judiciary Committee were never voted upon
by the House of Representatives as a whole.
2. The vote on the first article of impeachment was 22 Democrats and 6 Republicans
in favor and 11 Republicans against; the vote on the second article was 22 Democrats and
7 Republicans voted in favor and 10 Republicans against; the vote on the third article was
19 Democrats and 2 Republicans in favor and 2 Democrats and 15 Republicans against.
The Committee rejected two other proposed articles of impeachment, both by votes of 26-
12 against their adoption.
3. After President Nixon resigned and previously withheld tape recordings of his
conversations were made public, nine of the ten Republicans on the Judiciary Committee
who had voted against all of the proposed articles of impeachment filed supplemental
statements in the Committee's Final Report stating that they would have voted in favor of
impeachment on the House floor if they had known of the contents of the recordings.
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impeachment and all of the Democrats voting against.4 Opinion polls
and the results of the Congressional elections during or immediately
after the two impeachment votes suggest that the public viewed the
1998 Clinton impeachment as more political and less responsible than
the Nixon impeachment hearings of 1974.5
Although there were many reasons why the 1974 House
Judiciary Committee's hearings were more bipartisan in character,
three aspects of the 1974 Committee's impeachment process appear
to have fostered a less divisive proceeding. First, in 1974 the
Committee began its impeachment inquiry by forming a special non-
partisan Impeachment Inquiry Staff. That staff conducted a neutral,
behind-closed-doors investigation and then presented Committee
members in closed sessions with evidence and legal analysis in a non-
judgmental fashion. This created a core of mutual understanding
within the Committee that aided the formation of a bipartisan
majority at the end of the Committee's deliberations. The 1998
House Judiciary Committee, in contrast, had no such neutral
analytical process and its procedural and substantive deliberations
were marked from the outset by open partisan conflict.
Second, the Special Prosecutors who led the Watergate criminal
investigations of the activities of the Nixon White House, Archibald
Cox and Leon Jaworski,6 played no direct role in the 1974 House
4. The 1998 House Judiciary Committee voted along straight party lines, 21-16, in
favor of the first and third articles of impeachment. The Committee voted in favor of the
second article of impeachment by a margin of 20 to 17, with one Republican joining the
Democrats in voting against impeachment.
5. In the November 1974 midterm Congressional elections, held after the House
Judiciary Committee's impeachment vote and the August 9 resignation of Republican
President Nixon, the Democrats gained 43 seats in the House of Representatives, with
four of President Nixon's supporters on the House Judiciary Committee being defeated.
In the November 1998 midterm Congressional election, held during the middle of the
House's impeachment proceedings against Democratic President Bill Clinton, the
Republicans lost five seats in the House. Polls in the 1974 election showed strong
approval of President Nixon's proposed impeachment, while polls in the 1998 election
showed that impeachment proceedings against President Clinton were unpopular.
6. The incident that triggered the Watergate investigations was the arrest on June 17,
1992, of burglars working on behalf of President Nixon's reelection campaign who had
broken into the offices of the Democratic National Committee at the Watergate office
complex. On May 21, 1973, Attorney General Elliot Richardson appointed Archibald
Cox as Special Prosecutor in charge of the pending Watergate criminal investigation.
On the night of October 19, 1973, President Nixon ordered Attorney General
Richardson to fire Cox after Cox refused the President's order not to subpoena
presidential tapes and documents. When first Richardson and then Deputy Attorney
General William Ruckelshaus resigned rather than carry out President Nixon's order,
Solicitor General Robert Bork complied with the President's directive and fired Cox. The
events of that night came to be known as the "Saturday night massacre," and they
precipitated several resolutions calling for President Nixon's impeachment.
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Judiciary Committee's impeachment hearings. In 1998, in contrast,
Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr actively participated in the
Committee's impeachment hearings, strongly advocating President
Clinton's impeachment. Because Starr had long been seen by Clinton
supporters as a partisan adversary of the President, his participation
in the 1998 Judiciary Committee's hearings further politicized the
Committee's proceedings.
Third, the 1974 House Judiciary adopted a stringent standard for
presidential impeachment, requiring a serious abuse of presidential
power. It found that President Nixon's use of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Internal Revenue
Service and other government agencies to undermine his political
opponents and obstruct government investigations constituted a
sufficient threat to the constitutional order to warrant his
impeachment. The 1998 House Judiciary Committee adopted a far
broader view of its impeachment power, concluding that it could
impeach a president on the basis of personal misconduct that violated
the criminal law. Focusing its attention on President Clinton's
improper relationship with former White House intern Monica
Lewinsky, the 1998 Committee asserted that impeachment was
appropriate because the President lied under oath and obstructed
justice in the course of concealing his private personal relationship. If
the broad standard for presidential impeachment adopted by the 1998
House had been accepted by the Senate, it would have set a
precedent that could have led to the more frequent use of
impeachment as a partisan political tool.
I. Impeachment Inquiry Procedures
In conducting its inquiry into the possible impeachment of
President Nixon, the 1974 House Judiciary Committee adopted a
series of procedures governing the conduct of its investigation. At the
outset, it formed a special nonpartisan Impeachment Inquiry Staff,
consisting of outside attorneys hired specially for the impeachment
proceedings, headed by a respected Republican, John Doar.7
Although the members of the Staff were selected separately by the
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, they worked on an
integrated basis, sharing office space and participating jointly in
various working groups. The Staff operated under a rule of strict
confidentiality and there were no leaks of confidential information.
Even Judiciary Committee members other than the Chairman and
7. After being appointed head of the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department
under President Eisenhower, Doar continued in that position under Presidents Kennedy
and Johnson.
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Ranking Minority Member were given access to evidentiary material
gathered by the Staff only at executive sessions held toward the end
of the investigation.
The Impeachment Inquiry Staff began its work by reviewing the
history of English and American impeachments and publishing a
neutral report entitled "Constitutional Grounds for Presidential
Impeachment." At the same time, its bipartisan task forces reviewed
the record of the earlier Senate Watergate investigation,8 executive
branch documents that it subpoenaed and eventually confidential
grand jury materials given over by the Special Prosecutor. After the
Staff completed its compilation of factual material, the Committee
held executive sessions in which the Staff presented neutral
"statements of information," containing exculpatory as well as
inculpatory evidence. President Nixon's counsel was permitted to
attend the closed sessions and to submit evidence and present and
cross-examine witnesses. It was only after the completion of this
process that public hearings began. Although the public hearings
were, on occasion, contentious, the members operated from the basis
of a common understanding of the underlying facts and the law
relating to impeachment, and a sizable group of moderates within the
Committee, consisting of conservative Southern Democrats and
moderate Republicans, was able to reach consensus on the proposed
articles of impeachment. 9
In its 1998 Clinton impeachment proceedings, the House
Judiciary Committee also added special impeachment staff, but this
staff was divided along party lines and did not operate as an
integrated unit. There was no bipartisan review of the underlying
factual information and the Committee's analysis of the applicable
legal standard took place in contentious public hearings. The
Committee's proceedings were marked by repeated accusations of
partisanship and attempts to achieve a consensus on factual and legal
issues were unsuccessful. There were continual leaks of confidential
material and the sealed report of the Independent Counsel was made
public and placed on the Internet within two days after its delivery to
the Committee.
8. On February 7, 1973 the Senate voted to create a Senate Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities, headed by Senator Sam Irvin, to investigate the
Watergate break-in and its alleged cover-up. The Irvin Committee's televised hearings
drew wide public attention and uncovered evidence of unlawful conduct by White House
officials.
9. The 1974 Judiciary Committee voted in favor of three articles of impeachment and
rejected two proposed articles. Only eight Democrats voted in favor of all five articles and
only 10 Republicans voted against all five. Twenty members of the 38-member
Committee-13 Democrats and 7 Republicans-voted in favor of some of the articles
and against others.
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H. Role of the Independent Counsel
The House of Representatives' impeachment proceedings in the
cases of both President Nixon and President Clinton were preceded
by highly publicized criminal investigations. The two criminal
investigations differed substantially, however, in both the conduct of
the respective prosecutors and their roles in the subsequent
impeachment proceedings.
In the case of Watergate, both the first Special Prosecutor,
Archibald Cox, and his successor, Leon Jaworski, 10 were senior
statesmen of the legal profession who were not currently involved in
partisan politics. Cox had been Dean of the Harvard Law School and
although he served as Solicitor General under President Kennedy, he
was not politically active. Jaworski was a 68-year old Houston
attorney and a former President of the American Bar Association.
Although there were occasional allegations that they were biased,
both Special Prosecutors avoided partisan rhetoric or actions that
appeared to be political. After the Watergate Special Prosecutor's
office uncovered evidence of President Nixon's personal culpability, it
presented its findings in a neutral report, submitted under seal to the
District Court where the Watergate criminal proceedings were
pending. The report, which was later transmitted under seal to the
House Judiciary Committee, contained a simple recitation of facts,
including reference to particular tapes and the testimony of particular
witnesses, with no commentary, interpretations or conclusions.
The independent counsels who conducted the criminal
investigations that preceded the Clinton impeachment were
appointed under the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of
1994, Pub. L. 103-270 (June 30, 1994), amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-99,
which President Clinton signed on June 30, 1994. On August 5, 1994,
the Special Division of the United States Court of Appeals created
under the Act replaced the special prosecutor who had been
appointed by Attorney General Janet Reno, Robert Fiske, with
Kenneth Starr." Unlike Fiske, Starr had no criminal law experience.
10. After ordering the firing of Special Prosecutor Cox, President Nixon sought to
abolish the office of Special Prosecutor. He backed down, however, after the public
outcry over the "Saturday night massacre." On November 1, 1973 Acting Attorney
General Bork appointed Leon Jaworski, a respected former President of the American
Bar Association, as a new Special Prosecutor.
11. The three-judge panel that replaced Fiske with Starr included two conservative
Republican appointees, David Sentelle and Joseph Sneed. On July 14, 1994, during the
one-month period between the signing of the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act
and the appointment of Starr as the new Independent Counsel, Judge Sentelle had lunch
with Republican Senators Jesse Helms and Lauch Faircloth from their mutual home state
of North Carolina, in a meeting at which all participants subsequently denied discussing
the impending independent counsel appointment. Although no direct evidence has been
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Starr's background included indirect involvement in the Paula Jones
sexual harassment lawsuit against President Clinton, financial
contributions to organizations strongly opposed to the President and
strong ties to right-wing foundations and publications that were
among President Clinton's most vocal attackers. He also had
considered running as a Republican candidate for the United States
Senate less than two years before his appointment. Accordingly, for
supporters of President Clinton, Starr's appointment as Independent
Counsel was suspect from the outset.
As has been discussed at this Symposium, the Independent
Counsel Reauthorization Act included several provisions that led to
excessive and unwarranted independent counsel investigations. The
Act focused the independent counsel's resources on a single target,
granted the independent counsel a virtually unlimited budget, did not
impose a definite timetable, and provided inadequate oversight and
accountability. In addition, the low threshold for triggering the
appointment of an independent counsel resulted in investigations of
lower level officials and alleged criminal conduct that was not serious
in character.'2 Because Starr's investigations, like the investigations
of some of the other independent counsels, were massive and
protracted proceedings aimed at relatively minor offenses, they often
appeared to be unbalanced and politically motivated.
In addition, Starr took several steps that added to the appearance
that he was conducting a partisan inquiry. He chose to maintain his
partnership in a large corporate law firm whose clients included
companies that opposed policies of the Clinton administration. Some
of Starr's deputies were reported to have manifested personal
hostility to the President. At several points, the Starr investigation
was marked by leaks of grand jury and other confidential information
politically embarrassing to the President. Although Starr's office
denied being the source of the leaks, the repeated disclosure of
confidential information adverse to President Clinton contributed to
the perception that Starr's investigation was political in character.
Once the 1998 House Judiciary Committee began its inquiry into
the possible impeachment of President Clinton, Starr participated
actively in its proceedings. Rather than present the House with a
neutral report of his findings, such as the one Watergate Special
Prosecutor Jaworski submitted to the District Court overseeing the
adduced that their replacement of Fiske and appointment of Starr was politically
motivated, the chronology of the signing of the Act, Judge Sentelle's meeting with the
Republican senators, Fiske's removal and Starr's appointment engendered accusations
that Starr's appointment was political.
12. When the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act reached its five-year sunset
date on June 30, 1999, see 28 U.S.C. § 599, Congress refused to renew it.
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Watergate investigation, Starr filed a "referral" whose accusatory
character and anti-Clinton rhetoric contrasted markedly with the
Jaworski transmittal.1 3 Starr also appeared personally before the
Committee and argued strongly in favor of passing articles of
impeachment, becoming one of the President's most articulate
accusers.14 Because of the political controversy surrounding Starr's
background and the conduct of his criminal investigations, his
participation in the Committee's impeachment hearings helped to
foster the partisan atmosphere that pervaded the proceedings.
I. Standards for Presidential Impeachment
The charges against President Nixon in the 1974 impeachment
proceedings asserted serious abuses of presidential powers. They
alleged that President Nixon used government agencies, including the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Internal Revenue Service and the Office of the President itself, to
engage in a series of unlawful actions aimed at undermining his
political opponents and concealing his unlawful acts. President Nixon
was thus accused not merely of specific criminal acts, but also of
misusing his presidential office in an attempt to undermine the
electoral process through unlawful means.15
In contrast to the abuses of presidential power and misuse of
government agencies that underlay the Nixon impeachment
proceedings, the accusations against President Clinton in the 1998
impeachment proceedings centered on his sexual relationship with a
young White House worker and subsequent efforts to conceal that
relationship. No connection was shown between President Clinton's
alleged unlawful acts (perjury and obstruction of justice) and his
official presidential duties. The Committee adduced no evidence that
13. The Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act provided that an independent
counsel "shall advise the House of Representatives of any substantial credible information
which such independent counsel receives ... that may constitute grounds for
impeachment." 28 U.S.C. § 595(c). It did not provide that the independent counsel was to
participate in the House's impeachment proceedings.
14. Because he believed that it was inappropriate for Starr to "testify" before the
House Judiciary Committee, Starr's ethics advisor Samuel Dash resigned. Dash was a
Democrat who had served as minority counsel to the Irvin Committee during its
Watergate hearings, and his presence on Starr's staff had been cited by Starr's supporters
as showing that it was nonpartisan.
15. The 1974 House Judiciary Committee's conclusion that the standard for
presidential impeachment required a serious abuse of the President's Constitutional power
is most clearly shown by its rejection of a proposed article of impeachment based on
allegations that President Nixon had committed tax fraud. The Committee concluded that
even if criminal tax fraud occurred, it was not the type of abuse of presidential power that
warranted the Constitutional remedy of impeachment.
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President Clinton's alleged misconduct injured the constitutional
system of government or so severely undermined his functions as to
leave him unable to perform the duties of his office.
In voting along party lines to impeach President Clinton for
perjury and obstruction of justice in his grand jury and civil deposition
testimony concerning his alleged extramarital affair,16 the 1998 House
of Representatives departed from the standard for presidential
impeachment the House Judiciary Committee had followed in 1974.
Instead of viewing impeachment as a mechanism for remedying
serious abuses of presidential power, the 1998 House majority sought
to use impeachment to sanction President Clinton for allegedly lying
about improper personal conduct. If accepted by the Senate, this
expansion of the grounds for presidential impeachment could have
led to an increased use of impeachment for partisan purposes in the
future.
The Senate's surprisingly strong vote on February 12, 1999 to
acquit President Clinton of both of the articles of impeachment 17 was
a recognition that the 1998 House of Representatives' impeachment
proceedings were procedurally and substantively flawed. The 1998
House Judiciary Committee's failure to establish a neutral
impeachment inquiry process, together with its allowing Independent
Counsel Starr to participate in its proceedings as a prime advocate for
impeachment, fostered an impeachment inquiry process that was
partisan throughout. In addition, the House's adoption of a broad
standard of impeachment based on personal misconduct rather than
misuse of presidential power created a danger that impeachment
could become a commonly used political tool. In voting to acquit
President Clinton, the Senate correctly viewed the 1998 House's
actions as an improper and unwise use of its impeachment power.
16. See supra note 4.
17. The Senate's votes to convict President Clinton on the two articles of impeachment
were 45 in favor and 55 against and 50 in favor and 50 against. Sixty-seven votes were
needed for a conviction. All 45 Democrats voted not guilty on both articles. Ten
Republicans voted not guilty on the first article and five Republicans voted not guilty on
the second article.
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